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Abstract
According to the Kyoto Protocol, Slovenia is required to reduce GHG emissions to an 
average of 8% below base year 1986 emissions in the period 2008-2012. Slovenia estab-
lished different measures for reducing GHG emissions long before its ratification. It was 
first transition country who implemented CO2 tax in the 1997. Several changes in CO2 
tax have not brought the desired results. CO2 emissions have actually increased. At the 
beginning of 2005, Slovenia joined other EU member states by implementing the emis-
sions trading instrument, defined by new EU Directive. At the same time, Slovenia has 
adopted a new CO2 tax system, which is compatible with the new circumstances. The main 
purpose of this paper is to present the characteristics of Slovenian approach to national 
allocation plan for emissions trading and analyze the problems of the CO2 tax in Slove-
nia. Paper also describes the compliance cost of achieving the Kyoto target and expected 
movements on the Slovenian allowances market.
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1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol was established with the main aim of preventing further increases 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and global warming. Overall GHG emissions should 
be reduced to at least 5.2% below the 1990 level in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. 
Slovenia ratified the Kyoto Protocol on June 21, 2002 and agreed to reduce GHG emis-
sions to an average of 8% below base year 1986 in the period 2008-2012.
The Kyoto Protocol includes economic instruments, called flexible mechanisms, 
which are International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean De-
velopment Mechanism (CDM). The emissions trading mechanism in the EU is defined 
by the Directive establishing a scheme for GHG emission allowance trading, adopted on 
October 13, 2003 (Directive 2003/87/EC). The Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation are defined by the so-called Linking Directive, which was adopted by 
the EU Parliament on April 21, 2004 and by the Council of Ministers on September 13, 
2004 (Geres, 2004).
The emissions trading is divided into two phases in the EU. The first phase, in the pe-
riod 2005-2007, includes only emissions trading of carbon dioxide (CO2). The EU emis-
sions trading scheme includes energy activities, production and processing of ferrous met-
als, cement, lime, glass, ceramic and kiln production, and pulp and paper production. En-
ergy activities include combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 
MW (Directive 2003/87/EC, Annex I). Emission trading is built on the allocation of al-
lowances. Total allocation means the upper limit of the GHG emissions, which is defined 
by the agency responsible for a given period of time. Companies with lower emissions 
reduction costs may sell the surplus of their allowances to companies with higher emis-
sions reduction costs that cannot reduce their emissions efficiently.
The main purpose of emissions trading in Slovenia is to supplement domestic meas-
ures in order to reach the required reductions in GHG emissions. The most important do-
mestic measures are the existing CO2 tax, increasing energy efficiency, encouraging the 
consumption of renewable energy (biomass, solar energy and wind energy), switching to 
fuels with a lower carbon content (e.g. from coal to gas), environmentally sound waste 
management, encouraging public transport, stimulating combined heat and electrical en-
ergy production, energy labeling of household devices, improving energy efficiency of 
buildings (MOPE, 2003).
In this paper we will analyze only the CO2 tax and the emissions trading mechanism 
for GHG. Our main purpose is to present the establishment of the national allocation plan 
in Slovenia, the expected compliance costs for achieving the Kyoto target, and expect-
ed movements on the emissions allowances market in Slovenia. We will also present the 
main characteristics and efficiency of the CO2 tax in Slovenia.
2 The distance from the Kyoto Protocol target in the EU member states
The EU was enlarged on May 1, 2004, when ten new member states, including Slov-
enia, joined the existing members. According to current data, Slovenia is the only new 
member state that is not fulfilling the Kyoto commitment. Among old member states, 31
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the situation is worse: only France, Greece, Sweden, and the United Kingdom fulfill the 
Kyoto target, while only Germany is on the right path. The distance of the old member 
states (EU-15) from the Kyoto protocol targets is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1   Distance from the Kyoto target of the EU-15
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Data source: EEA (2005), CDR (2005) and own calculations.
Figure 2 illustrates the distance from the Kyoto target of the new member states (EU-10) 
and of Romania and Bulgaria. Among the new EU member states, Slovenia is the only 
one, which does not fulfill the Kyoto target. GHG emissions in the year 2002 were 20.2 
million tons CO2, which is only 1.9% lower than in the year 1986. In the year 2003 the 
emissions have been reduced for 3.4% according to the base year 1986 and were 19.9 
million tons CO2. The Kyoto requirement for Slovenia is 8% lower GHG emissions in 
2008-2012 than in the base year 1986. This means that Slovenia is still 4.6% away from 32
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the Kyoto target in the year 2003. Thus Slovenia will be a net buyer of allowances. Ac-
cording to some authors, the main reasons why some transition countries are in a better 
position than Slovenia in reducing the required emissions levels, include the following: 
higher efficiency in decreasing fuel consumption in industry and electricity and heat pro-
duction, more successful reductions of energy inefficiency in heavy industry and an effi-
cient overall restructuring of the economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which was 
followed by the closing down of some energy intensive companies (EEA, 2004b). Emis-
sions intensity data for the period 1997-2002 (Table 5), which we will address later, show 
that other transitional countries have managed to reduce their emissions intensity more 
than Slovenia, although the emissions intensity was at a higher level in these countries 
through the whole period.
Figure 2   Distance from the Kyoto target of new member states ( EU-10), Romania
and Bulgaria
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The biggest potential net seller of allowances is Poland, with around 55 million tons 
of CO2 per year (the current allocation is 246.7 million tons CO2 in 2005, 240.1 million 
tons CO2 in 2006 and 226.4 million tons CO2 in 2007; Poland’s CO2 emissions were cal-
culated at 219.7 million tons of CO2 in 2004 for total ETS1 sectors) (Carbon Market Eu-
1 Emissions trading scheme.33
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rope, May 27, 2005). However, results of recent research have shown that Polish instal-
lation operators would rather produce more electrical energy than sell the allowance sur-
pluses (Atkins, 2005). Analysis shows that all EU member states will produce around 84 
million tons of CO2 surpluses per year in the period 2005-2007. Poland is followed by 
the Czech Republic (with more than 10 million tons of CO2 per year), Lithuania (around 
7 million tons of CO2 per year), Estonia (with more than 5 million tons of CO2 per year), 
Slovakia (around 5 million tons of CO2 per year) and Latvia (around 2 million tons of CO2 
per year) (Carbon Market Monitor, March 18, 2005).
Slovenia followed the GHG emissions reduction target before the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol – that is, before June 21, 2002. In the beginning of 1997, Slovenia was 
the first of the transition countries to introduce a CO2 tax. European countries that im-
plemented a CO2 tax before Slovenia are: Finland (1990), Norway and Sweden (1991), 
Denmark (1992), and the Netherlands (1996) with ecological tax reform; the tax was ap-
plied since 1980 in different forms in Germany and Italy (1999) and in the United King-
dom (2001) (Gee, 1996; EEA, 2004a). In the following chapter the main characteristics 
of the CO2 tax in Slovenia are presented. 
3 Slovenia and the CO2 tax
When the CO2 tax was implemented in Slovenian tax legislation, it was 1 SIT/kg CO2 
(UL RS 68/96). In the year 1998, the tax was increased to 3 SIT/kg CO2
2 (UL RS 24/98). 
An additional change in the CO2 tax was introduced on January 1, 2003 (UL RS 91/02). 
Since then the tax has remained unchanged until 2005, when it was supplemented due to 
the emissions trading mechanism.
In the year 1997, when the CO2 tax was implemented, it was not originally intend-
ed to reduce CO2 emissions. It was implemented because of the additional demands of 
the national budget, due to the decline of some other budget revenues (at that time, the 
country had reduced social insurance contributions, which were paid by employers and 
in such a way it was hoped to unburden the labor factor). Beside this, the biggest CO2 
emissions producers were exempted from paying the CO2 tax (in the year 1997, thermal 
power stations, heating stations and boiler houses for heating produced more than 50% 
of total CO2 emissions). As we have already mentioned, the tax in the year 1997 was set 
at a very low level (1 SIT/kg CO2). Considering such a low CO2 tax level and the many 
exemptions for its payment, nobody expected that the CO2 tax could significantly influ-
ence emissions reductions.
In the year 1998, the tax level was increased to 3 SIT/kg CO2, but other big changes 
were not made to the tax. The detailed reasons behind this threefold increase in the tax 
level are not known, but we can assume that the main reason was: higher budget rev-
enues and the realization that the tax level was insufficient to achieve the required or 
needed effects. In December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was signed and the estimation 
that prevailed at that time was that the costs of CO2 emissions reduction to the required 
level should be between 10 and 20 EUR/t CO2. The suggested tax level of 3 SIT/kg 
2 See more about this tax in Markovič-Hribernik and Schlegelmilch, 1999; Schlegelmilch and Markovič-Hri-
bernik, 2002.34
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CO2 (16.1 EUR/t CO2) was within the expected costs range. In the year 1998, the big-
gest CO2 producers still did not have to pay the tax, which was supported by the politi-
cal background, because these biggest CO2 producers were (and still are) state owned. 
The country also protected domestic coal producers, especially to maintain social peace 
in regions where the population is very dependent on the existence of coalmines. The 
threefold increase in the CO2 tax level had a negative influence on the industry produc-
ers with a high share of fuel costs in the total value added (pulp and paper, industry of 
building materials and basic chemistry), which led to a worse competitive position for 
these producers.
The CO2 tax was once again changed in the year 2000. Changes have included the 
possibility for delaying repayments of already paid CO2 tax until 2009. The percentage 
of the repayment is smaller every year, with 2009 being the last year in which repayment 
can be required. The repayment can be claimed on the basis of the permit with the tax-free 
use of fuels, issued by the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning. Due to this 
change, revenues generated from the CO2 tax have since been reduced. The data present-
ed in Table 1 show the revenues generated from the CO2 tax and CO2 emissions.
Table 1   Revenues generated from CO2 tax and CO2 emissions in Slovenia
for the period 2000-2004
2000 2001 2002 2003a 2004a
CO2 tax revenues (in billions of  SIT) 7.6 7.5 6.5 9.2 9.6
CO2 emissions (in millions of tons) 15.2 16.3 16.4 16.1 –
CO2 tax 3000 SIT/t CO2
a In the years 2003 and 2004 repayments on the basis of permits with the tax-free use of fuels were 
paid out (7.1 billion SIT). Repayments are included in Table 1.
Source: Ministry of finance (internal data) and Ministry of Environment and Spatial planning (inter-
nal data); Agencija Republike Slovenije za okolje (2005).
From Table 1 we can see that CO2 emissions have increased since 2000, while in 2003 
a reduction can be noticed. With a more detailed analysis (Table 2) we discover that the 
biggest CO2 emissions reduction is located in the item “other sectors” within the energy 
sector. The item “other sectors” includes the commercial sectors, households and agri-
culture and forestry.
From Table 2 we can also see that the electricity and heat producers also reduced CO2 
emissions in the year 2003, relative to the year 2002. We could say that the main reason for 
this 3% reduction of CO2 emissions was smaller electricity production in thermal-power 
stations in the year 2003 compared to 2002. It was actually smaller by 206 GWh, which 
means a 2% reduction in electricity production. Smaller electricity production in thermal-
power stations is directly connected with the reduced use of lignite  (from 4.3 million tons 
in the year 2002 to 4.1 million tons in the year 2003). Also, the import of electricity was 
increased (by 2,191 GWh) in the year 2003 relative to the year 2002, while the export of 
electricity was increased by only 897 GWh. 35
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Table 2   Movements of CO2 emissions in Slovenia from 2000 to 2003
(in thousand tons)
2000 2001 2002 2003
Energy 14,362 15,409 15,474 15,141
A. Fuel combustion 14,325 15,349 15,416 15,072
Energy industries 5,487 6,233 6,402 6,222
Manufacturing industries and construction 2,300 2,358 2,384 2,367
Transport 3,653 3,786 3,800 3,935
Other sectors 2,885 2,972 2,830 2,548
B. Fugitive emissions from fuels 37 60 58 69
Industrial processes 840 880 871 934
Solvent and other product use 36 37 37 37
Total CO2 emissions  15,239 16,325 16,382 16,113
Source: UNFCCC (2005).
On the basis of the above-mentioned facts, it is again very difficult to say how much 
the CO2 tax has contributed to CO2 emissions reduction in the year 2003, as compared to 
the year 2002. Also, the biggest defenders of this tax, did not expect that the tax would 
be a solution for substantial CO2 emissions reduction in the short run or that the tax 
could play a crucial role in achieving the Kyoto target, but it can play an important role 
in changing the behavior of economic agents in the longer run.
To achieve higher CO2 tax efficiency, a substantial change was made in the CO2 
tax legislation in the year 2003, when the tax was subject to major turn-over with ac-
ceptance of a new decree on the CO2 emissions tax, and cancellation of all the old de-
crees concerning the CO2 tax (UL RS 91/02). According to this change, a person that 
produces CO2 emissions due to the consumption of fossil fuels must pay the tax. The 
CO2 tax must be also paid by the operator of a boiler installation, industry furnace, or 
incineration installation, which produces CO2 emissions by burning volatile organic 
compounds. Volatile organic compounds are not just fuels used in boilers or industry 
furnaces, but also organic wastes that are co-burned in boilers and furnaces, or burned 
in incinerators. This new decree was modified with two additional changes (UL RS 
8/03 and 46/04). 
The biggest change in the new decree was about the maximum quantity of CO2 emis-
sions allowed for installation operators. For example, a company that got a permit for the 
tax-free use of fuels for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004, has a right for tax repayment in 
the amount of 67%. This percentage changes for the year 2005 to 19% of the repayment. 
In subsequent years, the percentage of the repayment decreases by 8%, which means in 
the year 2006 the repayment is 11%, in 2007 it is only 3%, and in 2008 no repayment is 
possible. All other companies have a right for repayment until 2009, which is the last year 
a company can claim the repayment of the CO2 tax. These percentages are also included 
in the new decree of the CO2 tax connected with the emissions trading scheme, which was 36
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adopted by the Slovenian government on April 21, 2005 and published in UL RS 43/05. 
With the change in the CO2 tax, the measures for air pollution have been harmonized with 
the policy of government grants.
Figure 3 Revenues from environmentally related taxes in percentage of GDP for 2001
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Source: OECD (2003); Agencija Republike Slovenije za okolje (2003).37
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The new decree of the CO2 tax in Slovenia has been adopted due to a new instru-
ment of emissions trading, which started in the EU and in Slovenia on January 1, 2005. 
Both mechanisms are instruments of the economic policy for reducing GHG emissions. 
In the year 2004, the Commission approved the Slovenian draft in this field. Accord-
ing to the new legislation, a company with an exempted fuel producer permit does not 
pay the CO2 tax. Exempted fuel producer permits are issued by customs to the instal-
lation operator who has a permit for producing GHG emissions and is an energy inten-
sive company. An energy intensive company is a company whose costs for the purchase 
of fuels and electricity exceed 3% of the product value. Product value means sales rev-
enues which are increased or reduced by changes in the stock of both final and unfin-
ished products, reduced for goods and services purchasing costs. Companies with the 
exempted fuel producer permit have also right to claim back already paid CO2 tax for 
the period from January 1, 2005 until the acquisition of the permit. The new decree also 
enables the payback of the CO2 tax for the combined heat and power producers and in-
stallation operators that have made a contract, with the Ministry of the environment, for 
reducing the CO2 emissions within certain period (New Decree on the Tax on CO2 Emis-
sions, published in UL RS 43/05, April 29, 2005).
It can be concluded that current and previous measures for reducing GHG emis-
sions in Slovenia were not enough to reach the Kyoto target. The quantity and fore-
cast of GHG emissions deviates from the Kyoto target. Present projections show that 
Slovenia would need to reduce GHG emissions by 9% to reach the Kyoto target. 
Target GHG emissions according to the Kyoto Protocol are 19 million tons of CO2 
equivalent.3 Average GHG emissions 2008-2012 are estimated at 20.7 million tons 
of CO2 equivalent. GHG emissions in 2000 exceeded the base level emissions in the 
year 1986 (Burja et al, 2004). The data presented in Figure 3 show that Slovenia is 
a country with the lowest share of all environmental taxes in GDP, what can be also 
proved with the CO2 tax level, which is among the lowest. Beside this, the biggest 
CO2 emissions producers were exempted from the payment of the CO2 tax. This in-
cluded the thermal power stations Šoštanj and Trbovlje, which produced 5.1 million 
tons of CO2 in the year 2003, and comprise around 32% of the total CO2 emissions 
in Slovenia. The most important reason for this is the high expense of domestic coal 
and consequently, the low competitive position of the Slovenian thermal power sta-
tions using coal as a fuel.
4 Establishing the national allocation plan for emissions trading
4.1 Guidelines for establishing national allocation plans
The allocation of allowances in individual countries and all conditions for the undis-
turbed operation of the emissions trading scheme are defined by the national allocation 
3 CO2 equivalent is a general unit for calculating the emissions impact of other GHG: 1 kg methane – CH4 represents 
21  and 1 kg C2F6, which is a PFC, represents 9.200 kg CO2 equivalent. Every GHG represents a global warming danger: 
1 ton CH4 has a global warming potential, which is 21 times stronger than 1 t CO2 in a period of 100 years. 1 t HFC has 
from 140 to 11.700 times and 1 t SF6 has 23.900 times stronger global warming potential than 1 t CO2 (EPA, 2002).38
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plans (NAP). EU countries had to publish their plans and notify the European Commis-
sion by March 31, 2004 (for old members) or by May 1, 2004 (for new members). The 
Commission decided if it will accept or reject the NAP. In the first phase (2005-2007) only 
CO2 emissions will be traded (DEFRA, 2004b). In the second phase, 2008-2012, emis-
sions trading will be expanded to include other GHG and other activities. The NAP for 
this period must be submitted to the Commission by July 1, 2006. A final decision about 
the allowances allocation must be made no later than January 1, 2007. The installation4 
operator is required to report on emissions to the relevant authority at the end of each cal-
endar year. A number of allowances equal to the total emissions from the installation shall 
be surrendered by April 30 of each year. If the operator does not surrender sufficient al-
lowances by April 30 of each year to cover its emissions during the preceding year, an 
excess emissions penalty shall be paid. During the first phase 2005-2007, a lower excess 
penalty will be applied in the amount of 40 EUR/t CO2. In the second phase 2008-2012, 
a higher excess emissions penalty was adopted in the amount of 100 EUR/t CO2 equiva-
lent. Although the operator will pay the excess emissions penalty, the missing allowances 
shall be surrendered in next trading year.
National allocation plans (NAPs) in the individual member states are defined by the 
Directive 2003/87/EC together with the criteria for the establishment of NAPs. These cri-
teria are stated in Directive COM(2003) 830 final. NAPs can vary among member states 
in the following elements: allocation method, choice of the base period or year, possibil-
ity of transferring the emissions allowances in the next trading period 2008-2012 and the 
percentage of the new entrants reserve. If we compare the Slovenian NAP with the NAPs 
of other member states, the following can be seen: as is the case with many other coun-
tries, Slovenia has used the combination of two allocation methods, this is grandfather-
ing and benchmarking (ten EU countries have used the same combination as Slovenia, 
seven countries have used only grandfathering and other countries have used a combina-
tion of grandfathering, benchmarking, growth factors and early actions); by choosing the 
base year or period, Slovenia does not deviate from other countries; transferring the un-
used emissions allowances to the next period 2008-2012 is not allowed, as in almost all 
other member states (with the exception of France and Poland); solutions for the new en-
trants reserves are very different among countries.
4.2 Possible methods for allocating allowances 
The agency responsible for controlling GHG emissions in an individual country de-
fines the total quantity of allowed emissions by setting up the emissions trading scheme. 
The second step is to divide the total quantity of emissions into trading units, which are 
called allowances. After distribution, the allowances are allocated to individual partici-
pants that are taking part in the emissions trading scheme. 
The main allocation methods are grandfathering, auctioning and benchmarking. 
Grandfathering can be done on the basis of historical emissions, input quantity, pro-
4 Installation means combustion installation, which is defined as a stationary technical unit. This unit uses dif-
ferent kinds of fuel for the production of energy. Energy can be electricity, heat, or mechanical power. In the emissi-
ons trading scheme guidelines, combustion installations include electric boilers, generators, co-generation of heat and 
electrical energy, and gas turbines (including compressors) (DEFRA, 2004a).39
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duction, and indirect or direct emissions. The main difference between grandfathering 
and auctioning is that under grandfathering, existing sources have only to purchase any 
additional allowances they may need over and above the initial allocation. Under auc-
tioning, all allowances need to be purchased, not just the missing allowances (Tieten-
berg, 1999).
The main criteria for assessing the cost efficiency of various allocation methods are 
compliance costs, administrative costs (borne by the government to operate the emissions 
trading scheme), transaction costs, product market distortions and tax distortions (Baron 
and Bygrave, 2002; Harrison and Radov, 2002). In Table 3 we present a comparison of 
the cost efficiency for the above-mentioned allocation methods.
Table 3   Comparison of the cost efficiency of allocation methods – grandfathering, 
auctioning and benchmarking
Efficiency criteria Grandfathering Auctioning Benchmarking
compliance costs minimized costs minimized costs minimized costs
administrative costs initial costs of data 
collection and allocation 
administration 
– allocation of the 
allowances
no data collection or 
initial allocation costs, 
auction design and 
development costs
initial costs of data 
collection (BAT 
standards for each 
installation)
transaction costs costs on the secondary 
market – trading after 
the initial allocation
costs on the primary 
market – initial 
allocation and on 
secondary market
costs on the 
secondary market 
– trading after the 
initial allocation
product market 
distortions
indirect costs 
– influence of other 
markets on the 
emissions market
indirect costs 
– influence of other 
markets on the 
emissions market
indirect costs 
– influence of other 
markets on the 
emissions market
tax distortions limited influence on the 
existing tax legislation
influence on the tax 
legislation, due to 
auction revenues
very limited 
influence on 
the existing tax 
legislation
Source: Vis (2003), PWC (2003), Harrison, Radov (2002: 163-168) and UNCTAD (2001:126).
Most countries defend the efficiency of grandfathering with the fact that they cannot 
use auctioning without having a negative influence on the industry. The industry must pay 
for every additional unit of emissions produced, which in turn affects prices, production, 
and technology (Bohm, 2002). Recently the benchmarking method has become more and 
more popular. This method is especially appropriate when comparing the energy efficien-
cy of the participating installations. Many countries (including Slovenia) use a combina-
tion of at least two methods, most commonly grandfathering and benchmarking. Some 
countries have also used auctioning.40
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4.3 Preparations for establishing a national allocation plan in Slovenia
Directive 2003/87/EC for the greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading scheme 
sets the groundwork for establishing the national allocation plan (NAP) in Slovenia and 
other EU member states. Besides the Directive, the Guidance of the European Commis-
sion to assist member states in the implementation of Directive COM(2003)830 final is 
also very important for establishing the NAPs. This document contains the following 11 
criteria relating to the NAP (Directive COM(2003) 830 final):
  1   fulfilling the Kyoto Protocol commitments;
  2   assessments of current and future emissions development;
  3   potential to reduce emissions;
  4   consistency with other legislative frameworks;
  5   non-discrimination between companies, installation operators, and sectors;
  6   new entrants (operators or installations);
 7    early  actions;
  8   clean technology, including energy efficient technologies;
  9   involvement of the public;
 10   list of installations;
 11   competition from outside the EU.
Of the above criteria, numbers 2, 5, 9 and 10 are mandatory, while numbers 6, 7, 8 
and 11 are optional. Numbers 1, 3, and 4 are partly mandatory and partly optional. Slov-
enia has included all of the criteria in its NAP except 7, the criterion of early actions.
The procedure for establishing the NAP in Slovenia has started with the collecting 
of data on CO2 emissions (consumption of fuels, number of installations, type of installa-
tion, and installations’ accordance with BAT5 technology). The following were included 
in the procedure following installation: production of electricity and heat; production and 
processing of ferrous metals, cement, glass, lime, ceramic, and kiln production; pulp and 
paper production; and other industry engaged in energy activities that exceed 20 MW or 
15 MW6 of rated thermal input. Installation operators had to assure accurate data on the 
quantity of production (output) and the emissions per separate installation for the peri-
od 1999-2002. They also had to provide information about activating new installations 
in 2005-2007, and about expected output and CO2 emissions for 2005-2007. Allowances 
allocation was based on the highest annual CO2 emissions in the period 1999-2002. By 
establishing the NAP, Slovenia has taken into consideration first the top-down or macro 
allocation, where the target on the state level is considered; and second the bottom-up or 
micro allocation, where the target on the operator level is considered (Figure 4). The allo-
cation of allowances was first made on the sector level. Two sectors were included: power 
generation and industry. Further allocation was made on the installation level within these 
5 Best available techniques.
6 Installations exceeding 20 MW are automatically included in the NAP according to Directive 2003/87/EC 
Annex I. Installations exceeding 15 MW are included in the NAP on a voluntary basis.41
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two sectors. The allocation of allowances was based on the highest annual emissions in 
the period 1999-2002. The government’s goal was not to sell the allowances on auction, 
but to allocate them for free, i.e. the grandfathering method. The plan also incorporates the 
new entrants reserve (NER) in the amount of 200 thousand tons of CO2, which represents 
around 0.8% of total allocated allowances. If some of this reserve remains unused at the 
end of 2005-2007, this quantity will be sold on auction. By establishing the NAP, Slove-
nia has taken into consideration the criteria stated by the EU, except for early actions on 
the installation level. Only emissions reductions after the year 1999 have been included 
and they bring a reward to installation operators in the form of additional allowances. On 
the other side, reductions before the year 1999 do not bring such a reward (which would 
mean an early action on the installation level). 
Figure 4 Allocation method of establishing the NAP in Slovenia
power generation
industry
national
target
top down
analysis
operator 1
operator 2...
operator 94
operator target
bottom up
analysis
consolidation of
top-down and bottom-up 
information is necessary
Source: MOPE (2004)
The government sent the first version of the Slovenian national allocation plan for 
2005-2007 to the European Commission (EC) on April 29, 2004. In this version the allo-
cated quantity of allowances was calculated at 26.3 million for 2005-2007 (where 1 allow-
ance equals 1 ton of CO2). At that time 98 installations were included (MOPE, 2004).
The EC had some remarks on this first version, of which the most important were 
(Tavzes, 2004):
•   projections of GHG emissions up to 2012;
•   forecasted emissions reduction in other sectors (transportation, households, and the 
commercial sector);42
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•   expected economic growth and emissions intensity, which is calculated by the co-
efficient of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (in euros);
•   coordination with other legislation;
•   new entrants: it pertains to how the allowances from the closed installation can be 
transferred to the new (substitutive) installation. Allowances can be transferred 
only if we are dealing with the same new installation, or if the new installation is 
directly included into the production process at the same installation operator’s 
location;
•   allowances allocation to new installations (Slovenia has decided that new installa-
tions will not be entitled to 100% allocation of allowances from the new entrants’ 
reserve, but only to 80% - factor 0.8. The reason for this decision on the state level 
is that as many new installation operators as possible could get allowances from 
the NER’s);
•   NER’s (the reserve was initially estimated in the amount of 300 thousand tons of 
CO2, but in the final version this number was changed to 200,000 tons of CO2 or 
0.76% of the total quantity of sector allowances. In most cases only the repairs etc. 
were considered, which does not require allowances from the NER).
Slovenia considered all remarks from the European Commission and from installa-
tion operators when it established the NAP. According to the latest data, 94 installation 
operators will participate in the emissions trading scheme for the period 2005-2007. The 
total quantity of allocated allowances is 26.3 million (1 allowance = 1 CO2 ton, including 
the NER in the amount of 200 thousand CO2 tons). 
Table 4 Emissions intensity in Slovenia (in CO2 kg per 1 euro of GDP)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2008
CO2 emissions (in million of tons) 15.1 15.2 16.3 16.4 16.1 –
GDP (in billion of euros) 19.8 20.7 21.9 23.5 24.6 –
Emissions intensity 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.70 0.66 0.57
Source: Bank of Slovenia (2003; 2005); MOPE (2004); AMOPE-EIONET (2004); Agencija 
Republike Slovenije za okolje (2005); Kranjčevič (2004); Own calculations.
Remarks from the European Commission took into consideration so-called emissions 
intensity. The emissions intensity coefficient, which measures CO2 emissions per GDP (in 
euro), is expected to be smaller in the coming years. The emissions coefficient should be 
lowered especially because of CO2 emissions reduction after the year 2008, due to fulfill-
ing the Kyoto protocol commitments (see Table 4).
At this point, a comparison of the Slovenian emissions intensity with that of other se-
lected countries is very interesting. We have chosen those countries for which we could 
find all necessary data for calculating the emissions intensity. The comparison is present-
ed in Table 5. 43
T. Markovič-Hribernik, A. Murks: The Long Road from Ljubljana to Kyoto: Implementing Emission Trading 
Mechanisms and CO2 Tax
Financial Theory and Practice 30 (1), 29-65 (2006)
Table 5 Emissions intensity in selected countries (in kg CO2 per 1 euro of GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Slovenia 0.94 0.86 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.70
Austria 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.32
Belgium 0.57 0.58 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.49
Czech Republic  3.15 2.77 2.66 2.12 1.88 1.57
Denmark 0.44 0.39 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.29
Estonia 4.70 3.66 3.23 2.86 2.55 2.31
Finland 0.62 0.56 0.53 0.47 0.50 0.50
France 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27
Greece 0.87 0.90 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.75
Ireland 0.54 0.52 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.35
Italy 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.37
Latvia 1.61 1.38 1.10 0.83 0.81 0.75
Hungary 1.46 1.37 1.33 1.16 1.02 0.83
Germany 0.48 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.41
Netherlands 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.40
Poland 2.66 2.24 2.14 1.74 1.53 1.52
Portugal 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.55 0.52 0.52
Slovakia 2.41 2.22 2.25 1.85 1.85 1.65
Spain 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.47 0.47
Sweden 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.21
United Kingdom 0.46 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.32
Norway 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.20
Switzerland 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15
Canada 0.93 0.97 0.89 0.74 0.72 0.74
Japan 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.26 0.29
USA 0.76 0.72 0.65 0.55 0.51 0.52
Source: Bank of Slovenia (2003; 2004; 2005), EUROSTAT (2002; 2003; 2004); MOPE-EIONET 
(2004), UNFCCC (2004; 2005); UNFCCC (2005) and EEA (2004a); Own calculations.
It is possible to see movements in the emissions intensity coefficient in each country 
from 1997 to 2002, and at the same time to compare the emissions intensity coefficients 
between countries. Higher or lower emissions intensity is not only a consequence of chang-
es in the quantity of emissions, but also due to changes in GDP. Data for CO2 emissions 
in 2002 show that CO2 emissions have increased in Slovenia, Austria, Belgium, Estonia, 
Finland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Canada, Japan and the US in comparison to 2001. In the 
remaining 15 selected countries, CO2 emissions have been reduced. Data for GDP show 
a bit different picture. In 2002, GDP has been nominally reduced in only three countries 
– Canada, Japan and the US – in comparison to 2001. GDP data for Poland in 2002 were 
not available. Although CO2 emissions have increased in most countries, the emissions 
intensity coefficient has fallen in all countries except Canada, Japan, and the US (the co-44
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efficient has fallen due mainly to reduced GDP, and partly to increased CO2 emissions). 
In the remaining eight countries, where emissions have increased in 2002 in comparison 
with 2001, emissions intensity has fallen because of sufficiently high increases in GDP. 
In Table 5 we can also notice countries whose emissions intensity has fallen through-
out the 1997-2002 period. These countries are Slovenia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, UK and Switzerland. 
It can also be noted that the emissions intensity for 2002 is substantially higher in Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Slovakia (the highest was reached in Estonia at 2.31 kg CO2 per 
euro of GDP). Very low emissions intensities can be seen in Austria, Denmark, France, 
Sweden, UK, Norway, Switzerland and Japan (the lowest is Switzerland at 0.15 kg CO2 
per euro of GDP). Slovenia, with an emissions intensity coefficient of 0.70 kg CO2 per 
euro of GDP, is in the middle. It is very interesting to compare Slovenian emissions in-
tensity with the emissions intensity of other transitional countries. Slovenia has the low-
est emissions intensity of them all, although other countries managed to achieve a greater 
drop in the emissions intensity of the observed period. 
4.4 Allocation plan for emissions allowances
4.4.1 Determination of the total quantity of allowances
Due to ratification of the Kyoto protocol, Slovenia is required to reduce GHG emis-
sions to an average of 8% below base year 1986 emissions in the period 2008-2012. 
Base year emissions were 20,601 thousand tons CO2 equivalent. Emissions in the pe-
riod 2008-2012 must therefore be limited to 19 million tons CO2 equivalent, including 
sinks7 (Burja et al, 2004). According to data on GHG emissions for the year 2002, they 
are exceeding target emissions (which are 19 million tons CO2 equivalent) by 7.5% 
(UNFCCC, 2004). Target emissions in Slovenia shall be achieved with the following 
additional measures: GHG emissions trading scheme, trading with gas and electricity, 
changing the CO2 tax, encouraging combined heat and power production, encourag-
ing the production of electricity from renewables and increasing their usage, reducing 
emissions of F-gases, informing consumers about CO2 emissions from motor vehicles, 
and reducing waste (Burja et al, 2004). Expected GHG emissions reduction to 2008 is 
presented in Table 6. 
The estimated contribution (according to the national “OPGHG”)8 from Slovenian 
EU ETS participants by the year 2008 is emissions reduction of 4.2% for the industry sec-
tor and 10.6% for the power generation sector. Emissions from participants in 2002 rep-
resent approximately 60% of total national CO2 emissions.
Slovenia has allocated 99.24% of the total quantity of allowances to existing instal-
lations on a free basis, and the remaining 0.76% will form a reserve for new entrants. If 
there are any surplus allowances in the NER after allocation to the relevant installation, 
these will be auctioned at the end of the 2005-2007 trading period. 
7 Sinks in the Kyoto Protocol can be any process, activity or mechanism that takes GHG from the atmosphere. 
This commonly refers to vegetation (such as forests) which takes CO2 from the atmosphere. 
8 Operational Plan for GHG Emissions Reduction.45
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Table 6   GHG emissions in Slovenia in the years 1986, 2002, 2003 and 2008 by 
including additional measures (in thousands of tons CO2 equivalent)
1986 2002 2003 2008
Energy 15,603 16,080 15,796 15,651
Industrial processes 1,309 1,083 1,164 1,138
Solvent and other product use 128 73 70 37
Agriculture 2,564 2,050 1,967 2,146
Waste 997 916 898 904
TOTAL emissions 20,601 20,202 19,895 19,875
Total sinks  -2,950 -5,561 -5,561 -3,754
allowed sinks -1,708
estimated used sinksa -840
TOTAL emissions + sinks 20,601 20,202 19,895 19,035
Distance from target emissions  1,648 1,249 942 82
Target emissions 2008-2012 (-8 %) 18,953
a Due to the fact that sinks must be caused directly by human activity, a conservative estimate 
has been used. According to this, only a half of the allowed sinks can be used:  840.000 tons CO2 
equivalent in the period 2008-2012.
Source: Burja et al (2004), UNFCCC (2004, 2005).
4.4.2 Determination of the quantity of allowances at the sector level
Slovenia has decided to use a two-stage approach for allocating allowances. First, 
the total number of allowances has been allocated to two sectors (power generation and 
industry). Second, allowances within each sector have been calculated for each installa-
tion (UL RS 112/04).
The total quantity of allowances (EK) was calculated as follows:
  EK = EKEnerg + EKInd + NV  (1)
EKEnerg: allocation for the power generation sector;
EKInd: allocation for the  industry sector;
NV: new entrants reserve allocation.
For each installation, an historical baseline is calculated as the highest annual emis-
sions in the period 1999-2002. By summing up all baseline emissions for each installa-
tion, the baseline allocation at sector level was calculated. The sector allocation for indus-
try also includes process emissions, which are not based on fuel usage.
The sector allocation for 2007, based on fuel usage in the relevant period, is calcu-
lated taking into account the “sector emissions reduction factor” (SFZ). SFZ is based on 
each sector’s Kyoto emissions reduction target according to the national “OPGHG.” The 46
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SFZ for the power generation sector amounts to 0.894 (or 10.6% reduction), and for the 
industry sector amounts to 0.958 (or 4.2% reduction by 2008).
Allocation of allowances for the power generation sector (EKEnerg):
 EKEnerg = ∑EKEnerg, god = EKEnerg, 2005 + EKEnerg, 2006 + EKEnerg, 2007 (2)
 EKEnerg, 2005 = ∑IEN  (2.1)
 EKEnerg, 2007 = (∑IEN) x SFZEnerg = (∑IEN) x 0,894  (2.2)
 EKEnerg, 2006 = (EKEnerg, 2005 + EKEnerg, 2007)/2 (2.3)
Allocation of allowances for the industry sector (EKInd):
 EKInd = (∑EKInd, god) + EKInd, proc = EKInd, 2005 + EKInd, 2006 + EKInd, 2007 + EKInd, proc  (3)
 EKInd, 2005 = ∑IEN  (3.1)
 EKInd, 2007 = SEInd, 1999 x SFZInd = SEInd, 1999 x 0,958  (3.2)
 EKInd, 2006 = (EKInd, 2005 + EKInd, 2007)/2 (3.3)
 EKInd, proc = 3x ∑IENInd, proc (3.4)
IEN: baseline installation emissions from fuel usage (highest annual emission in 1999-2002);
SFZ: sector emissions reduction factor (0.894 for power generation and 0.958 for industry);
SEInd,1999: emissions in the industry sector in 1999 from fuel usage;
EKInd,proc: sector allocation for process emissions.
4.4.3 Determination of the quantity of allowances at the installation level
Slovenia has determined two different allocation methods for each sector. However, 
the allocation method within each sector is the same for all installations within the sec-
tor (UL RS 112/04).
Allocation of allowances at the installation level within the power generation sec-
tor (IAEnerg):
For allocation at the installation level within the power generation sector, a method 
based on forecasted emissions according to the national “OPGHG” has been used. 
 IAEnerg = ∑PEEnerg, year = PEEnerg, 2005 + PEEnerg, 2006 + PEEnerg, 2007 (4)
IAEnerg: allocation at the installation level for the  power generation sector;
PEEnerg,year: forecasted emissions at the installation level consistent with the national “OPGHG” 
for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007.47
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Allocation of allowances at the installation level within the industry sector (EKInd):
For allocation at the installation level within the industry sector, a combination of 
grandfathering and the BAT-benchmarking method was used.
 IAInd = ∑IAInd, year = IAInd, 2005 + IAInd, 2006 + IAInd, 2007 + IAInd, proc (5)
Allocation at the installation level (not for combined heat and power production) based 
on baseline emissions from fuel usage was:
 IAInd, year = IEN x A x KInd, year (6)
IAInd: allocation at the installation level for the industry sector;
IEN: baseline installation emissions from fuel usage (highest annual emission in 1999-2002);
A: the allocation factor is determined by the installation’s BAT compliance (0.90 means BAT com-
pliant installation, and 0.85 means BAT non-compliant installation);
Kind,year: correction or balancing factor for the industry sector for each year.
The correction or balancing factor for the industry sector (KInd) has been calculated 
as follows:
 K Ind, year = (SEyear)/( ∑IEN x A)  (7)
SEyear: emissions for the industry sector for each trading year (2005-2007).
High efficiency CHP (combined heat and power) installations are considered in dif-
ferent ways. First, the contribution from the electricity and heat production side must be 
determined:
 IAElectricity = EEF x EP  (8)
 IAHeat = A x (IEN - IAElectricity) (9)
 IAyear = (IAElectricity + IAHeat) x Kind,year  (10)
IAElectricity: allocation at the  installation level for the industry sector for electricity production;
EEF: emissions factor for electricity production (0.44 kgCO2/kWh);
EP: electricity production in CHP in kWh for the baseline year in the period 1999-2002;
IAHeat: allocation at the  installation level for the  industry sector for heat production;
A: the allocation factor is determined by the installation’s BAT compliance (0.90 means BAT com-
pliant installation, and 0.85 means BAT non-compliant installation);
IEN: baseline installation emissions from fuel usage (highest annual emission in 1999-2002);
Kind,year: correction or balancing factor for the  industry sector for each year.
Emissions allowances for the production of electricity by high efficiency CHP in in-
dustry will be granted at a BAT norm of 0.44 kg CO2/kWh for production of the same quan-48
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tity of electricity as during the relevant year of the reference period 1999-2002. Emissions 
allowances for electricity is now dependent only on the correction factor (Kind,year).
Allocation at the installation level within the industry sector for emissions from proc-
esses (non-combustion activities) was calculated as follows:
 IAInd, proc = 3 x IENInd, proc (11)
IAInd,proc: allocation at the installation level within the industry sector for process emissions;
IENInd,proc: highest annual emissions from processes at the installation level in the period 1999-2003.
The main reasons why Slovenia has decided to use a different allocation method for 
each sector are following (MOPE, 2004):
•   forecasted emissions in accordance with the national “OPGHG” at the installa-
tion level are controllable because they include only six installation sites and op-
erators (the public companies Energetika Ljubljana and Toplotna Oskrba Maribor; 
Termoelektrarna Brestanica, Šoštanj, and Trbovlje; and Termoelektrarna-Toplarna 
Ljubljana);
•   forecasted emissions at the industry sector level were done only at the sector level, 
but not at the installation level. This is why the allocation from the first paragraph 
cannot be used;
•   production data for energy activities in the industry sector are reliable, whereas heat 
production data are not. A method needing both power and heat production data can-
not be applied uniformly for this sector;
•   the industrial sector is very heterogeneous. The IPPC9 directive with its BAT stand-
ards is not suitable for all industry activities. Thus two methods were used. Due to 
differences between individual activities, a combination of grandfathering (based 
upon historical emissions) and the benchmarking method (based upon fulfilling 
BAT standards) was used.
The Slovenian NAP shall also consider termination of installations. If an installation 
is permanently put out of service during the year 2005 and 2007, the operator may retain 
and freely dispatch the allowances allocated for the calendar year in which the installation 
is terminated. Allowances allocated to the installation for the remaining years of the trad-
ing period will not be given to the operator, but will be transferred to the new entrants’ re-
serve. All unused allowances (after February 28, 2007) will be sold at auction.
4.4.4 Allowances reserves for new entrants
Slovenia was also required to adopt the decision on the new entrants’ reserve (NER). 
The Slovenian NER for the period 2005-2007 is estimated at 200 thousand tons CO2 or 
0.76% of the total allowances allocated to the installations. The largest amount of the al-
lowances, allocated to the operator for new installation, is limited by 1/15 of the total new 
entrants’ reserve; this is 13.3 thousand tons CO2 per year.
9 Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control.49
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There are three different approaches for determining the new entrants: a) a new in-
stallation; b) replacement of an existing installation with a new one; c) extension (recon-
struction) of an existing installation.
The allocation formula for allowances arising from new entrants is as follows (UL 
RS 112/04):
a) IANew entry = 0,8 x APE  (12)
IANew entry – allowances allocation on the new installation level;
APE – forecasted emissions in accordance with BAT standards. 
The factor 0.8 is used for two reasons. First, a 20% lower allocation shall act as an 
additional stimulus for operators in future emissions reduction. Second, the new entrants’ 
reserve shall be accessible to a larger number of operators. This is important especially 
due to the fact that the reserve is smaller than the expected demand. The current situation 
shows that actual CO2 emissions from new installations are going to be around 300,000 
tons, but the ministry must also include the state target (-8%), therefore is not possible to 
include this quantity.
b)   The operator retains all allowances from the replaced installation(s). The surplus 
of allowances can be considered a reward for emissions reduction.
c)   The formula presented under approach a) can be used only for the extended (re-
constructed) part of the installation(s).
The allowances from the new entrants’ reserve will be allocated only to those instal-
lations that are fully in accordance with the BAT standards. When this is possible, the val-
ues from the BREF documents10 are mandatory to be considered. Operator, who wishes to 
get the allowances from the NER, must prove that he uses the newest (up-to-date) tech-
nology available on the EU market (UL RS 53/05).
All unused allowances will be sold at auction after February 28, 2007. The Sloveni-
an Environmental Protection Act (UL RS 41/04, Article 126) states that in the first period 
2005-2007 at most 5%, and in the Kyoto period 2008-2012 at most 10%, of the total al-
located allowances can be sold at auction.
4.5 Some remarks on the Slovenian national allocation plan
The accepted NAP has raised several questions about the suitability of the solutions 
that were emphasized during the establishment process by industry and energy represent-
atives. The main questions are:
•   The suitability of the chosen base year or period: companies had the possibility to 
choose between the years 1999 and 2002, by which the year with the highest emis-
sions could be chosen. The primary question is why the possibility only extended 
until the year 2002. In the time when the NAP was established, data for the year 2003 
would also have been available and a lot of companies had made many investments 
10 Reference Document on Best Available Techniques.50
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(precisely in the discussed period), that increased production and at the same time 
CO2 emissions as well. Let us take one such example – TALUM ltd., Kidričevo - 
which deals with aluminum production. TALUM activated a lot of installations in 
2003, which were the result of one of the biggest investments in the field of indus-
try in Slovenia. All of these new installations utilize the latest technology, which has 
been proven to fulfill very strict BAT standards. It can be said that a company with 
investment growth contributes to higher economic growth at the state level, but on 
the other hand, the company did not get a chance to use higher reference emissions 
in the year 2003. From the company’s point of view, we are dealing with the ques-
tion of a rightful choice for a base year or period;
•   The possibility of transferring the unused emissions allowances in the next trading 
period 2008-2012: most of the member states (including Slovenia) have not allowed 
the possibility of transferring emissions allowances in the next period 2008-2012. 
This means that all unused allowances by the end of the year 2007 must be sold, ei-
ther on the market or through an auction. If the quantity of unused allowances were 
to be too big, some companies could be in worse position, because they would not 
be able to sell their allowances at attractive prices. But, if we consider data on emis-
sions in 2003 and suppose that this situation remains unchanged until the end of 
2007, then the data shows the following: despite the expected sales of the emissions 
allowances, especially by new EU member states, there is going to be a shortage of 
allowances, due to the higher quantity of demand. In Table 7 we present the emis-
sions situation in the year 2003 and target emissions for both old and new EU mem-
ber states. Data shown in Table 7 indicate that the old member states ( EU-15) had 
higher emissions in the year 2003 compared to the target emissions for 2008-2012. 
These higher emissions are estimated at 272.59 million tons CO2 equivalent. While 
the new member states ( EU-10) had lower emissions in the year 2003 compared 
to the target emissions - lower emissions are estimated at 272.72 million tons CO2 
equivalent. It can be concluded that the demand (with unchanged conditions in the 
field of GHG emissions) exceeds supply by 136 thousand tons CO2 equivalent.
Table 7   Greenhouse gas emissions in CO2 equivalents and Kyoto Protocol targets
for 2008-2012
Base GHG 
emissions in 
million
Target GHG 
emissions
2003 GHG 
emissions
(in million of tons CO2 eq.)
EU-15 4,253 3,907 4,180
EU-10 1,100 1,018 745
Total EU-25 5,352 4,925 4,925
Note: Cyprus and Malta do not have Kyoto targets
Source: Carbon Market Analyst (2005b) and EEA (2005)51
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•   New entrants reserve: emissions allowances for covering CO2 emissions due to 
activating new installations are included in the new entrants reserve. At first, the 
new entrants reserve in Slovenia was set at 300 thousand tons CO2. The founda-
tion for this quantity of reserve was data collected by installation operators. They 
were obliged to supply data on how many new installations they intended to acti-
vate in the period from 2005-2007 and what the emissions produced by these new 
installations would be. The government later reduced this reserve to 200 thousand 
tons CO2 and thereby “cut down” the companies by 100 thousand tons CO2. Re-
duction was necessary, in order to fulfill the state’s target (-8%). The question that 
rises at this point is did the installation operators “over-blow” their own needs in 
the beginning.
•   Allocation methods for emissions allowances: as we have already mentioned, Slov-
enia used a combination of two methods – grandfathering and benchmarking. The 
main reason for using these two methods was to ensure a correct as possible allo-
cation of emissions allowances.  Benchmarking is only used for the industry sector 
at the installation level, while it was not used for the energy sector. For this sector, 
only the projection of the emissions was considered (in accordance with the Oper-
ational Plan for GHG Emissions Reduction – UL RS 112/04). The consequence of 
such an unequal emissions allowances allocation is that the energy sector gained 
more emissions allowances than the industry sector, according to historical emis-
sions. Representatives of the energy sector even negotiated with the government 
so that the initial emissions allowances allocation was increased by 739 thousand 
tons, while the industry did not reach any kind of increase in spite of the many com-
plaints addressed to the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning.
5 The Kyoto Protocol and its target costs
In accordance with EU guidelines for establishing the national allocation plan, the 
total potential for reducing GHG emissions should also be considered. The total poten-
tial for reducing GHG emissions is estimated to be 4.5 million thousand tons CO2 equiv-
alent in the period 2008-2012. 
It has been estimated that 1.7 million tons CO2 equivalent could come from the first 
group of contributors (e.g. switching from coal to natural gas with the liberalization of 
the energy markets, emissions standards, CO2 tax, purchase of more efficient motor ve-
hicles, etc., where specific annual reduction costs for GHG emissions are under 5 EUR/t 
CO2 equivalent). It has been estimated that 2.5 million tons CO2 equivalent could come 
from the second group (e.g. emissions trading instrument, regular control over exhaust 
gases, use of economic instruments in the transportation sector, thermal insulation of 
buildings and heating systems, use of renewable energy, containing HC/PFC and reduc-
ing use of these substances as coolants etc., where the specific annual reduction costs are 
between 5 and 20 EUR/t CO2 equivalent). It has been estimated that 302 thousand tons 
CO2 equivalent could come from the last three groups (301 thousand tons CO2 equivalent 
for specific annual reduction costs between 20 and 100 EUR/t CO2 equivalent; and thou-
sand tons CO2 eq. for specific annual reduction costs over 100 EUR/t CO2 equivalent). 52
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At this point in the paper, we should emphasize the fact that with a different range 
of estimation an uncertainty of the actual individual costs of measures has been given, as 
well as the inaccurate choices of these measures or instruments. Not only will the cheap-
est measure be used, but the combination of different measures as well.
Table 8 Movement of the Kyoto target emissions reduction costs
Potential 
(in thousand tons CO2 eq.)
Annual GHG emissions reduction 
costs (in EUR/t CO2 equivalent)
Total potential 4,506 <5 5-20 20-50 50-100 >100
1. Highest costs
used potential 1,694 433 1,081 90 90 0
considered price in EUR/t CO2 eq. 5 16 50 100 150
Average annual costs in millions 
of euros
33 2,17 17,30 4,50 9,00 0,00
2. Lowest costs
used potential 1,694 1,219 446 29 0 0
considered price in EUR/t CO2 eq. 5 16 50 100 150
Average annual costs in millions 
of euros  15 6.10 7.14 1.45 0 0
Source: Burja et al. (2004).
From Table 8 we can see that total costs for achieving the Kyoto targets are expect-
ed to be in the best case around 15 million euros per year, and in the worst case around 
33 million euros per year. By this we have considered the price of the reduction poten-
tial in the second group at 16 EUR/t CO2 equivalent. If we assume that the price is not 16 
but 20 EUR/t CO2 equivalent, this change would increase the Kyoto Protocol compliance 
costs to 16.5 and 37.3 million euros per year. In fact, actual costs will depend on the actu-
al achieved GHG emissions reductions and on the market price of the allowances. 
We can say that Kyoto targets can be achieved with relatively acceptable costs, and 
emissions trading in this case is one of the important economic instruments for achieving 
these targets. The actual potential for reduction, which meets the Kyoto targets, amounts 
to 1.7 million tons CO2 equivalent (this is the difference between the target emissions of 
19 million tons CO2 equivalent and the actual forecasted emissions of 20.6 million tons 
CO2 equivalent). Thus the potential in the first two groups should be enough for achiev-
ing the Kyoto targets (Burja et al, 2004).
Actual GHG emissions reduction will, of course, depend on the efficient implemen-
tation of the planned measures. The most important anticipated measures for individual 
sectors according to the expected reduction potential of the GHG emissions are shown in 
Table 9. A reduction potential in GHG emissions assumes specific annual reduction costs 
from 5 to 20 EUR/t CO2 equivalent.53
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Table 9   Most important measures for reaching the Kyoto target in Slovenia and their 
reduction potential
Sector Measure Reduction potential
(in thousand tons CO2 eq.)
Energy Switching from coal to natural gas, new 
small hydro and wind power stations
1,469
Industry and construction Increasing the energy efficiency,
co-generation, switching fuels with low 
carbon content
705
Transport Higher energy efficiency of vehicles, 
higher importance of public transport
475
Other sectors (households) Heat protection for buildings, efficient 
heating systems
399
Industrial processes Adopting the IPPC directive, reducing 
the HFC/PFC as a cooling substance
260
Agriculture Increasing the intensity of breeding, 
reduction of nitrogen fertilizers
61
Waste Sanitation of existing, and building of 
new, garbage dumps in accordance with 
EU standards
126
TOTAL 3,495
Source: MOPE (2003)
The total potential for the reduction of GHG emissions, as seen in Table 9, amounts 
to 3.495 thousand tons CO2 equivalent. This means that Slovenia could, with the reali-
zation of all the most important measures, exceed the required reduction of GHG emis-
sions by 1.8 million tons CO2 equivalent or 106%. Among the measures that would in-
fluence GHG emissions reduction on a small scale, are especially: the reduction of losses 
in the current system of distance heating (total reduction by 70 thousand tons CO2 eq.), 
the use of renewable energy sources (wooden biomass – total reduction by 40 thousand 
tons CO2 eq.), sustainable usage of space (total reduction by 65 thousand tons CO2 eq.) 
and higher energy efficiency of installations in the commercial sector (total reduction 
by 99 thousand tons CO2 eq.). 
Two measures that are treated as the most expensive (their specific annual costs ex-
ceeds 20 EUR/t CO2 equivalent) are: encouraging the construction of a Hydro power sta-
tion chain on the river Sava (total reduction by 120 thousand tons CO2 eq.) and the con-
sumption of bio-fuels (total reduction by 106 thousand tons CO2 eq.). We should not for-
get that the emissions trading instrument is only foreseen for the power sector, industry 
sector, and construction and industrial processes.
Among the instruments that Slovenia has already accepted or is in the process of ac-
cepting and that will help carry out the measures presented in Table 9, are the following: 54
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an emissions trading instrument, liberalization of the natural gas and electricity market, a 
CO2 tax, industry adoption of the ecological standards (e.g. IPPC directive until the year 
2007), excises on fossil fuels and electricity, stimulations for combined heat and power 
production, stimulations for electricity production from renewable sources, the promotion 
of energy efficiency in the public sector, stimulations for  consumers on the efficient use 
of energy, energy labeling of household appliances, energy certificates for buildings, in-
forming consumers about motor vehicles’ CO2 emissions, stimulations for the consump-
tion of bio-fuels, reduction of F-gases, specific agriculture policy measures and waste 
treatment. By analyzing the situation in the field of CO2 emissions in Slovenia, we should 
not forget the importance of the transport sector, in which CO2 emissions amount to 24% 
of total CO2 emissions. At the moment, the instrument of emissions trading is not fore-
seen in this sector. Instead, three main measures are imagined: informing the consumers 
about a motor vehicle’s CO2 emissions, encouraging the use of bio fuels (direct payments 
from the government budget and exemption of the excise payment) and increasing pub-
lic transport and expanding bicycle paths).
When we talk about the possible ways to reach the Kyoto target, we should also men-
tion two other Kyoto mechanisms; this is the clean development mechanism (CDM) and 
joint implementation (JI). At the moment, Slovenia does not have the intention of using 
these two mechanisms, due to the government’s opinion that they would cause too high 
of an administrative burden. Project mechanisms require very precise control and actual 
emissions reduction must be constantly proven, which on the other hand demands a long-
lasting and very expensive procedure. Besides this, Slovenia does not have the appropri-
ate available technology for such cooperation.
6 Trading with emissions allowances and determining their price
One of the most important aspects of the emissions trading scheme will definitely be 
change in the prices of the allowance. Nowadays it is very difficult to predict very pre-
cisely what the price of the allowances will be in the future, but for sure we can say, that 
they are influenced by the prices of oil, coal and electricity.
The European market for CO2 emissions is working, but has not fully come to life. 
Europe has been dealing with emissions trading since April 2003. The last quarter of 2004 
registered about 7.1 million tons of CO2 trades on the emissions market. In the entire year, 
approximately 88.2 million euros worth of coupons were traded with the average price of 
8.82 EUR/t CO2 (Carbon Market Daily, 2005). 
The bear trend was present on the emissions market in January and February 2005, 
when the price fell to under 7 EUR/t CO2. The main reason for such a low price was the 
weather: a very mild winter resulted in reduced electrical energy and heat production, and 
in the end lower CO2 emissions. A big turnover occurred in March 2005, when the price 
went mad and the bullish trend caused record allowance prices. The price of allowances 
increased in March 2005 by almost 50%, from 9.49 to 14.26 EUR/t CO2. According to ac-
tual data for the 1st Quarter 2005, almost 27 million tons of CO2 were traded, with an aver-
age price of around 9 EUR/t CO2. In April 2005 the price exceeded the level of 17 EUR/
t CO2 several times. According to actual data for the 2nd Quarter 2005, almost 50 million 
ton of CO2 were traded, with an average price of around 18 EUR/t CO2. 55
T. Markovič-Hribernik, A. Murks: The Long Road from Ljubljana to Kyoto: Implementing Emission Trading 
Mechanisms and CO2 Tax
Financial Theory and Practice 30 (1), 29-65 (2006)
Figure 5 Movements in the price of allowances for 2005 delivery 
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A surprised situation appeared on the market, when the magical level of 20 EUR/t CO2 
was exceeded and continued with daily rise on average of 0.50 EUR/t CO2 until the mid-
dle of July. From the end of July and until the end of September the price did not move 
much, it has stayed almost at the same level, between 20 and 23 EUR/t CO2. More changes 
happened in the traded quantities, which have risen in the 3rd Quarter 2005 to almost 100 
million tons of CO2 (4th Quarter exceeded this limit), mainly due to the quantities traded 
on the exchange markets and wider OTC market of the emissions allowances. An average 
price in the 3rd Quarter 2005 was calculated at 23.21 EUR/t CO2 and in the 4th Quarter 2005 
at 21.76 EUR/t CO2. Total average price for the year 2005 was calculated at 18.19 EUR/t 
CO2. The comparison of the average price between 4th Quarter 2005 and whole year 2005 
shows, that the latter is smaller due to low prices at the beginning of the year 2005.
It is very interesting to observe how emissions trading on European markets is grad-
ually developing. We already mentioned that trading started in the year 2003, although 
with minimum quantities. In 2004 the quantities rose by about 32 times. Predictions for 
the year 2005 are for an increase of about 26 times of trading quantities (Table 10).
Movements in the price of allowances from 2003 to 2005 are illustrated in Figure 5. 
Key parameters or factors that have caused situation on the emissions market are: tem-
perature changes, an allowances deficit on the agent side, and the Commission’s deci-
sion about the Czech and Polish NAPs. The Commission decided that these two coun-
tries must reduce the allocation if they want their NAPs to be approved. On the other side, 
we have a bullish trend on the oil market, where the price of the Brent barrel exceeded 
65 USD/barrel.56
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Table 10 Development of the EU emissions trading scheme
Year Quarter Quantity 
(inthousand tons)
Index Qt/Qt-1
Total 2003 Q2 – Q4 302 –
2004 Q1 181 –
Q2 437 241
Q3 1,970 451
Q4 7,065 359
Total 2004 9,653
Forecast 2005 Q1 24,000 340
Q2 52,500 219
Q3 72,000 137
Q4 105,000 146
Total forecast 2005 253,500
Actual 2005 Q1 26,646 –
Q2 49,154 184
Q3 98,141 200
Q4 117,723 112
Total 2005 291,664 115
Source: Carbon Market Analyst (2005a; 2005b); Carbon Market Daily (2003-2005).
Past experiences with price movements on the emissions market are very diverse. 
In the future the supply of allowances will be fixed, and restrictions are on the national 
allocation plans. Demand will depend on the production of CO2 emissions on the com-
panies’ side. In general, the production of CO2 emissions depends on weather condi-
tions (temperatures, rain and wind speed), oil prices, fuel prices, carbon prices, and eco-
nomic growth. Among the many factors, weather conditions have a double effect: first, 
low temperatures increase energy consumption and with this CO2 emissions, through 
increased electricity and heat production. Second, rain and wind speed have an impact 
on electricity production from clean sources, and with this on the emissions level. Thus 
weather conditions are a very important element that will definitely influence the crea-
tion of the allowances price, and which was clearly illustrated on the emissions market 
in January 2005.
6.1 Expected movements on the emissions allowance market in Slovenia
The biggest CO2 emissions producers in Slovenia are thermal power stations (in the 
year 2002, thermal power-stations and heating stations produced 6.4 million tons CO2 
equivalent of GHG emissions, which amounted to almost 40% of total GHG emissions 
produced in the power generating sector, and more than 30% of total GHG emissions. 
The number did not change in 2003 for the share in the power sector, but has risen to the 57
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31% of total GHG emissions). The situation described above is also reflected in the na-
tional allocation plan. 
From Table 11 we can conclude that only two power-stations – Šoštanj (the biggest 
Slovenian power station) and Trbovlje – will get 59.13% of the total allocated allowanc-
es for the period 2005-2007. The total allocation is 26.3 million allowances. Meanwhile, 
the share of the allocated allowances for the power-generating sector is 70%, and for the 
industry sector just 30%, of total allocations. Thus it can be concluded that Slovenian 
thermal power stations have the potential for GHG emissions reduction. How? With the 
investments into changing the fuel consumption from coal to gas. As we know we still 
have some stations or parts of them, that are using coal as a fuel and therefore this can 
be changed to gas.  
Table 11 shows the allocation of allowances for some thermal power stations and 
some companies participating in the EU emissions trading scheme.
Table 11   Number of allocated allowances of some selected Slovenian companies and 
thermal power stations in the period 2005-2007
Installation operator Sector 2005 2006 2007 Total
Termoelektrarna Šoštanj power 4,740 4,465 4,190 13,396
TE-toplarna Ljubljana power 836 803 770 2,409
TE Trbovlje power 743 714 684 2,141
Salonit Anhovo - cement industry 487 479 470 1,436
Lafrage cement industry 314 308 302 924
Vipap Videm Krško industry 262 248 235 744
Slovenske Železarne – Acroni industry 87 84 80 251
TE Brestanica power 86 83 79 249
Količevo Karton industry 74 70 66 210
Nafta - Petrochem industry 66 63 59 189
JP Energetika Ljubljana power 49 47 45 141
JP Toplotna Oskrba Maribor power 33 32 31 96
Total allowances in thuosand tons 7,778 7,395 7,012 22,185
Share of total allowances, in % 84.50 84.40 84.40 84.43
Source: UL RS (112/04; 131/04).
However, power stations are the ones that do not see a lot of possibilities for the re-
duction of GHG emissions in the coming years. The first problem is coal, which is used 
by thermal power plants. Coal is one of the biggest burdens for the environment, espe-
cially when it is used in old power plants. Slovenian coal, which is used by power plants, 
is of very low quality and low energy value. On the other hand, high-quality coal, which 
could be imported from abroad, is not suitable for use in old (out-of-date) boilers. If some 
technological movements will be made in the energy sector, the allocated quantity of al-
lowances would also assure an adequate volume of production. 58
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In the present situation, we are dealing with the question of whether the purchase 
of missing allowances will still enable competitive electricity production in thermal 
power stations. The question is very convenient because the Slovenian electro-energy 
balance for the year 2005 anticipates from two to three percent growth in final ener-
gy consumption. This means higher production and consequently higher GHG emis-
sions. Due to everything aforementioned, thermal power stations will not be sellers of 
allowances.
In comparison to power stations, industry has very limited and narrow room to 
move. In cement, pulp and paper, lime, and glass factories, emissions depend on the 
quantity of production. Coal has been nearly replaced in industry by other energy sourc-
es (e.g. gas), and some improvements have been made. Some industry has been de-
stroyed due to the transition process. Revenue from selling allowances is not enough 
for investment in technical improvements, energy co-generation, or switching to re-
newable energy.
If we want to estimate how many missing emissions allowances the companies that 
are participating in the emissions trading scheme will have to buy, if they do not man-
age to reduce CO2 emissions in another way, problems arise. OPGHG does not consider 
the impact of each individual instrument (e.g. precise GHG emissions reduction in tons), 
but it analyzes the total impacts of all possible instruments on the movement of GHG 
emissions. The impact of the emissions trading instrument is thus included among the 
impacts of other measures. Therefore, we will try to estimate the potential missing emis-
sions allowances from the available and accessible data. Total CO2 emissions for the pe-
riod 2005-2007 are estimated at around 47.2 million tons CO2, this means around 15.7 
million tons CO2 per year. In comparison, the CO2 emissions for the year 2003 were cal-
culated at 16.1 million tons. The total quantity of the allocated emissions allowances for 
the period 2005-2007 amounts to 26.3 million, which represents a 56% share of planned 
emissions in the period 2005-2007 and a 54% share of total emissions in the year 2003. 
If we anticipate that the situation will remain the same and that the planned annual CO2 
emissions for the electricity and heat-production sector are estimated at 6.1 million thou-
sand tons CO2 and that the quantity of the allocated allowances for the year 2007 is 5.8 
million, this would mean, that this sector is going to have a shortage of emissions allow-
ances in the amount of 288.784 - and it should buy them in the future. But if we also in-
clude the shortage of emissions allowances in the industry sector, then the total annual-
ly missing allowances would be at around 500 thousand tons CO2, as is likewise fore-
seen in OPGHG.
In the year 2005 and 2006, the energy sector will probably not be a net buyer of al-
lowances, while the situation is different in the industry sector. According to available in-
formation, which originates from industry representatives, the industry will face a short-
age of allowances already in the year 2005. But it is very difficult to estimate to what ex-
tent the industry is going to be a net buyer of allowances, because no publicly accessible 
data is available. Partly, the results from the questionnaire executed in July 2005 could 
be of great assistance. Sixty-four percent of all participating companies in the emissions 
trading scheme have responded to the previously mentioned questionnaire. The most im-
portant results of the survey are as follows (Murks, 2005):59
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•   78% of inquired companies will actively participate in the emissions allowances 
market;
•   42% of inquired companies will be forced to buy emissions allowances, according 
to production volume;
•   39% of inquired companies will participate in the emissions allowances market al-
ready in the year 2005, 32% will be active in the following years;
•   64% of inquired companies are satisfied with the emissions allowances allocation 
procedure, 28% are not satisfied (it should be mentioned, that a lot of representa-
tives from the energy sector took part and that they have achieved very favorable 
allowance allocations for the years 2005 and 2006);
•   opinions regarding the usefulness, efficiency and effectiveness of the emissions trad-
ing scheme are very diverse: 1/3 had a positive opinion, 1/3 had a negative opinion 
and 1/3 had no opinion..
In the future, the Slovenian market for emissions allowances will share the movements 
of the European emissions allowances market, because its share is 0.4% of the total allo-
cated allowances in all the member states of the EU25. Such a small market cannot oper-
ate successfully and efficiently, which means, that it should be a part of the larger market. 
It is estimated that Slovenian companies will mostly trade with companies from the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. As we have already mentioned, the traded quan-
tity of the emissions allowances in Slovenia will be between 300 thousand and 500 thou-
sand tons CO2 per year, depending on the measures that will be used by individual com-
panies within the OPGHG. According to this, the final costs of reaching the Kyoto target 
will depend on the effectiveness of the chosen measures and movements on the emissions 
allowances market.
7 Conclusion
Protection and awareness of a cleaner environment is becoming one of the most im-
portant considerations, especially in developed countries. In light of protecting the envi-
ronment, the Kyoto Protocol represents a special turning point. Slovenia ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol in the year 2002 and agreed to reduce GHG emissions by 8% in the period 2008-
2012 relative to the base year 1986. Slovenia already started with the implementation of 
the economic instrument for reducing GHG emissions in the year 1997, when the CO2 
tax was established and it became the first of the transition countries to implement this 
instrument. Although this tax was not implemented for reducing CO2 emissions in the 
first place (very low prices and payment exemptions for many main polluters), but rath-
er for additionally supplementing the state budget because of a reduction in other budg-
etary revenues (lower social insurance contribution, which are paid for by employers). 
The CO2 tax went through several changes, the last one was in the year 2005, when the 
emissions trading instrument was adopted in Slovenia. There was a threefold increase in 
the CO2 tax and this new level could have had much more influence on polluters’ behav-
ior and CO2 emissions reduction, if the country did not introduce a permit for the tax-free 
use of fuels. The main reason for this was pressure from industrial producers with a high 60
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share of fuel costs in total value added. A threefold increase of the CO2 tax, without the 
introduction of special permits, could also contribute to higher budgetary revenues from 
a tax source. But, on the contrary, CO2 tax revenues have been lower from the year 2000 
onward. The CO2 tax can be also blamed for the fact that tax revenues have not been used 
for CO2 emissions reduction projects.
In the year 2005, Slovenia has, as other EU member states, implemented another 
economic instrument for reducing GHG emissions: the emissions trading scheme. In ac-
cordance with the EU emissions trading scheme, Slovenia established a national alloca-
tion plan (NAP). Slovenia has used two different methods for the allocation of allowanc-
es, separated between two sectors – the power generation sector and the industry sector. 
Allocation at the sector level is calculated taking into account the sector emission reduc-
tion factor, which is based on each sector’s Kyoto emissions reduction target. The fac-
tor for the power generation sector is 0.894 (or 10.6% reduction), and for the industry 
sector 0.958 (or 4.2% reduction). Besides the grandfathering method (the highest emis-
sions between 1999-2002), the benchmarking method was also used. Benchmarking was 
based on the BAT values for the power generation sector and the industry sector. BAT 
values were included according to the installation’s efficiency. More efficient installa-
tions received a higher quantity of allowances, while less efficient installations received 
fewer allowances.
A comparison of the Slovenian NAP with the NAPs of other EU member states shows 
the following: Slovenia has used a similar combination of two methods as most other EU 
member states, this is grandfathering and benchmarking; by choosing the base allocation 
year or period, Slovenia does not deviate from other countries; transferring the emissions 
allowances to the next trading period 2008-2012 is not allowed in most EU countries, also 
in Slovenia; new entrants reserves show a different picture, because their percentages are 
very different among individual countries.
Naturally, a question that arises is: are Slovenian solutions optimal, especially from 
the Kyoto target compliance costs and rightful allocation point of view and so on? Some 
remarks were given from the industry and energy side. These remarks were connected with 
the choice of the base year or period (companies had the possibility to choose between 
1999 and 2002, although at that time, when the NAP was being prepared, emissions for 
the year 2003 were already known). If emissions in the year 2003 were also included, this 
would have meant a better position for some of the participants. The government also re-
duced the initially set new entrant reserve from 300 to 200 thousand tons CO2 (this data 
was collected directly from the installation operators, according to the activation of new 
installations and their planned emissions) and therefore the operators fell short by 100 
thousand tons CO2. Although the country wanted the most correct emissions allowances 
allocation, some deviations from the principle can be seen. This deviation is present be-
tween the industry sector and the power generation sector. Benchmarking has been used 
only for the industry sector, while for the power sector only emissions projections in ac-
cordance with the OPGHG were used. Representatives of the power generation sectors 
have been successful in their negotiations with the government, meanwhile the industry 
has not been successful in any claim.61
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Slovenia has decided not to use two other flexible mechanisms; that is Joint Im-
plementation and the Clean Development Mechanism. The main reason, given by the 
government, was the high administrative burden, beside this Slovenia did not have the 
appropriate available technology. Besides the emissions trading instrument and CO2 
tax, Slovenia is going to use (or is already using) other instruments (measures) that 
will more or less reduce GHG emissions. A special problem in all of this is the trans-
portation sector, which has a 24% share in total CO2 emissions. At the moment, trans-
port is not included in the emissions trading scheme, but increasing the energy effi-
ciency of vehicles and giving a major role to public transport could reduce emissions 
in this sector. 
What the Kyoto Protocol compliance costs will be in Slovenia at the end will depend 
on the efficiency of the already implemented and planned measures or instruments for re-
ducing the emissions, as well as on the emissions allowances price. Present price is around 
23.50 EUR/t CO2, mainly because of the exceeded demand, while it was in January and 
February around 7 EUR/t CO2. Such extreme movement means high uncertainty for the 
potential buyers of the emissions allowances and higher risk on the emissions market. To 
what degree the participating companies will need to buy the missing emissions allow-
ance, if they do not manage to reduce the required CO2 emissions, is very difficult to pre-
dict. The estimated quantity is around 500 thousand tons CO2 per year.
The Kyoto Protocol compliance costs in Slovenia were estimated between 15 million 
euros per year (in the best case) and 33 million euros per year (in the worst case). Actual 
movements can also mean a deviation from the included presumptions; therefore the final 
outcome could be less favorable than the expected one. A change in the price of the reduc-
tion potential in the second group (annual GHG emissions reduction costs are between 5 
and 20 EUR/t CO2 eq.) from 16 to 20 EUR/t CO2 equivalent (see Table 8) would increase 
the Kyoto Protocol compliance costs to 16.47 and 37.29 million euros per year.
The fact is that the process of reducing GHG emissions will demand a different ap-
proach from the approaches used to solve other environmental problems. GHG emis-
sions are connected with much more dispersed sources of direct and indirect emissions, 
therefore their future reduction will depend on a wide range of decisions of economic 
agents. The government could affect those decisions through a wide spectrum of avail-
able instruments: economic instruments (taxes, price regulations, financial incentives, 
tax exemptions, emissions allowances), decisions about managing public property and 
performing public services (e.g. decisions about energy activities, energy-efficient con-
sumption in public buildings and so forth), legal regulations (technical and ecological 
standards, operation conditions, legal and institutional framework for efficient markets, 
etc.), indirect stimulating activities (promotional projects, information campaigns, ad-
vise services etc.), R&D and other instruments. We must say that we are dealing with a 
very complex task, but we cannot just take into account the costs criteria, but also the 
following criteria: enabling international competitiveness of the economy, adjustments 
to financial possibilities, enabling reliable energy, food and other strategic goods sup-
ply, social justice and acceptability, increasing employment, adaptability and the long-
run sustainability of accepted decisions. Only time will show what price we will have to 
pay for the accepted targets. 62
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